united states v wurie

The officers entered the apartment to “freeze” it while they obtained a search warrant. Second, the government places great weight on a footnote at the end of Chadwick stating that searches of the person, unlike “searches of possessions within an arrestee's immediate control,” are “justified by ․ reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest.” 433 U.S. at 16 n. 10. The Chadwick footnote is surely meant to reference similar language in Robinson explaining that, because the “custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment[,] ․ a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.” 414 U.S. at 235. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15. This case presents the Supreme Court with the task of clarifying the scope of Fourth Amendment protection extended to an arrestee’s cell phone. At 11 a.m., the Court will hear a federal case, United States v. Wurie. While the warrantless search of Wurie's phone fits within one of our “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,” United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 724 (1st Cir.2011) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), due to the rapid technological development of cell phones and their increasing prevalence in society, cell phone searches do pose a risk of depriving arrestees of their protection against unlawful searches and seizures. In Chadwick, the defendants were arrested immediately after having loaded a footlocker into the trunk of a car. 790, 979 N.E.2d 210, 213–16 (Mass.2012). Nov 20 2013: Reply of petitioner United States filed. The United States and California focus primarily on the second . Riley v. United States & United States v. Wurie, 573 U.S. ___(2014), June 2014. Robinson may not have rejected Chimel in the context of searches of an arrestee and items on the arrestee, but it did establish that these searches differ from other types of searches incident to arrest. The court conducted a reasonableness analysis, balancing the privacy interests of the individual against the sovereign's interests in policing its borders. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found Wurie guilty of all three counts. “At the touch of a button a cell phone search becomes a house search, and that is not a search of a ‘container’ in any normal sense of that word, though a house contains data.” Id. The majority has instead chosen to ignore this option in favor of a rule that sweeps too far. at *10. TOP Download PDF The Supreme Court is gradually coming to terms with the effect of … Get free access to the complete judgment in United States v. Wurie on CaseMine. Nov 20 2013: DISTRIBUTED for Conference of December 6, 2013. Thank you for your time, we will now take any questions. This was and is a normal incident of a custodial arrest․” Id. Id. The personal and private files and records stored on cell phones are the sort that historically would have been “stored in one’s home and that would have been off-limits to officers performing a search incident to arrest.” United States v. Wurie, See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974). The searches at issue in Chadwick and Gant were general, evidence-gathering searches, not easily subject to any limiting principle, and the Fourth Amendment permits such searches only pursuant to a lawful warrant. Though a majority of these courts have ultimately upheld warrantless cell phone data searches, they have used a variety of approaches. Moreover, Chadwick states that the arrest itself diminishes the arrestee's privacy rights over items “immediately associated” with the arrestee. He was sentenced to 262 months in prison. This “literal reading of the Robinson decision,” Flores–Lopez, 670 F.3d at 805, fails to account for the fact that the Supreme Court has determined that there are categories of searches undertaken following an arrest that are inherently unreasonable because they are never justified by one of the Chimel rationales: protecting arresting officers or preserving destructible evidence. E.g., United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir.2009); Finley, 477 F.3d at 260; Commonwealth v. Phifer, 463 Mass. These two cases raise a common question: whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information on It is true that Robinson speaks broadly, and that the Supreme Court has never found the constitutionality of a search of the person incident to arrest to turn on the kind of item seized or its capacity to store private information. The fact that “my house” repeatedly called Wurie's cell phone provided an objective basis for enhanced concern that evidence might be destroyed and thus gave the police a valid reason to inspect the phone. We begin from the premise that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14, 99 S.Ct. The Court found that the search-incident-to-arrest exception permits an arresting officer “to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction” and to search “the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items.” Id. We made a similar observation in United States v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603 (1st Cir.1975), where we upheld the warrantless search of a briefcase incident to an arrest. We have long acknowledged that police officers can extract this type of information from containers immediately associated with a person at the time of arrest. After Wurie parked the car, that officer arrested Wurie for distributing crack cocaine, read him Miranda warnings, and took him to the police station. After about five more minutes, the officers opened the phone to look at Wurie's call log. Reasonableness is the standard by which society measures the constitutionality of a governmental search. Begin typing to search, use arrow keys to navigate, use enter to select. The Court of Appeals noted that information stored on cellular phones is of a kind otherwise off-limits to police searches incident to an arrest. Accordingly, the professors argue that an individual’s loss of the former, such as during an arrest, does not necessarily imply a loss of the latter. Id. Today, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, unless one of “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” applies. See Flores–Lopez, 670 F.3d at 806–10 (considering whether either of the Chimel rationales applies to cell phone data searches); cf. Under the Fourth Amendment,1 warrantless searches are per se un-reasonable unless they fall into one of a few “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”2 In Chimel v. California,3 the Su- In Flores–Lopez, Judge Posner suggested that courts should balance the need to search a cell phone against the privacy interests at stake. That conclusion was based, at least in part, on Seventh Circuit precedent allowing a “minimally invasive” warrantless search. The Court’s ruling in this case, in tandem with a similar case called California v. Riley, implicates an ongoing debate about how to properly reconcile the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections with evolving information technologies. Robinson reiterated the principle, discussed in Chimel, that “[t]he justification or reason for the authority to search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial.” Id. Indeed, the Government has not even suggested that he was aware of the presence of the paint chips on his clothing.”). In that case, the Ninth Circuit determined whether a warrantless forensic examination of a laptop computer during a border search violated the Fourth Amendment. Admittedly, when forced to confront the boundaries not only of the Fourth Amendment, but also of the technology in question, it is not surprising that we would look beyond the case at hand and theorize about the long-term effects of our decision. Some have concluded that, under Robinson and Edwards, a cell phone can be freely searched incident to a defendant's lawful arrest, with no justification beyond the fact of the arrest itself. at 30–31. The police officers copied this piece of paper, which action Sheehan challenged as an unconstitutional seizure. The district court denied Wurie's motion to suppress, United States v. Wurie, 612 F.Supp.2d 104 (D.Mass.2009), and, after a four-day trial, the jury found Wurie guilty on all three counts. So long as they remain in the hypothetical realm, I think it premature to draw the line. Because the government has not argued that the search here was justified by exigent circumstances or any other exception to the warrant requirement, we reverse the denial of defendant-appellant Brima Wurie's motion to suppress, vacate his conviction, and remand his case to the district court. Factual Background. at 909. Opinion for United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 905, 907–09 (2010); see generally William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 602–1791 (2009). at 15 (emphasis added). That information is, by and large, of a highly personal nature: photographs, videos, written and audio messages (text, email, and voicemail), contacts, calendar appointments, web search and browsing history, purchases, and financial and medical records. at 235. It is also at least theoretically necessary to protect the arresting officer, who does not know what he will find inside the cigarette pack. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. That holding was predicated on an assumption, clarified in Chadwick, that “[t]he potential dangers lurking in all custodial arrests” are what “make warrantless searches of items within the ‘immediate control’ area reasonable without requiring the arresting officer to calculate the probability that weapons or destructible evidence may be involved.” 433 U.S. at 14–15. Flores–Lopez, 670 F.3d at 806. at 220–23. These organizations warn that intrusions into cellular phone data may now jeopardize the very same privacy interests that the Fourth Amendment traditionally protected. The United States concedes that what constitutes reasonable scope is the subject of some debate, but nonetheless maintains that a similar situation arose in Robinson, which should control here. IV, in electronic format on a cell phone, carried on the person. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. The United States notes that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine extends beyond the person of the arrestee, but is limited to the area around the arrestee’s immediate control, or his reaching distance under the ruling in Chimel v. California. After his arrest, police realized that Edwards's clothing, which he was still wearing, might contain paint chips tying him to the burglary. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Four years later, in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), the Supreme Court examined how the search-incident-to-arrest exception applies to searches of the person. Incident to the arrest, the police seized a flip-style cell phone from Wurie and noticed that it was receiving calls from “my house,” as displayed on the external screen. As we explain below, this case therefore turns on whether the government can demonstrate that warrantless cell phone searches, as a category, fall within the boundaries laid out in Chimel. Neither Wurie nor the United States disputed the relevant facts, and they agreed that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. Thus, the holding in Chadwick applied only to “luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” Id. The United States thus maintains that under the Robinson standard, the search of respondent Wurie’s cellphone was constitutional because the cellphone was on Wurie’s person. The United States, however, argues that the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed, claiming that the warrantless search of a cellphone seized from Wurie’s person is constitutional. Courts have struggled to apply the Supreme Court's search-incident-to-arrest jurisprudence to the search of data on a cell phone seized from the person. A rule based on particular instances in which the police do not take full advantage of the unlimited potential presented by cell phone data searches would prove impotent in those cases in which they choose to exploit that potential. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538. The majority asserts that this scenario would be present “in almost every instance of a custodial arrest,” giving police an ever-ready justification to search cell phones. Finally, the United States contends that it has been well settled for decades that the police may seize “a briefcase or package” in possession of a person during arrest and subsequently search the property without a warrant after the arrestee is taken into custody, and the same well settled principle ought to apply to cellphones and to the immediate case at hand. Authors. While most of the analysis focused on the timing of the search, the opinion assumed that law enforcement could “tak[e] from [the arrestee] the effects in his immediate possession that constituted evidence of crime. As we mentioned earlier, the officer who conducted the search in Robinson had no idea what he might find in the cigarette pack, which therefore posed a safety risk. The police also saw at the residence a woman and a baby who resembled the figures in Wurie’s phone wallpaper. More importantly, the United States claims that limiting the scope of searchable items, and making police rely on a case-by-case determination, may impose a heavy burden on law enforcement working in the field. Mobile-Phone Searches by Police Get Top U.S. Court Review. April 9, 2014 • Legal Briefs By Jim Harper and Ilya Shapiro. Relying on those safety and evidentiary justifications, the Court found that a search of a vehicle incident to arrest is lawful “when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” Id. These cases, taken together, establish that items immediately associated with the arrestee—as a category—may be searched without any Chimel justification. The Supreme Court has described Otis's argument as “perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions of the mother country.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625, 6 S.Ct. Through the first-floor apartment window, the officers saw a black woman who looked like the woman whose picture appeared on Wurie's cell phone wallpaper. In the end, we therefore part ways with the Seventh Circuit, which also applied the Chimel rationales in Flores–Lopez. This is particularly troubling because I had no idea that the police do not need a warrant to search my cell phone. The government bears the “heavy burden” of proving that the good-faith exception applies, United States v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 468 (1st Cir.2005), and it did not invoke the exception before the district court. We are reminded of James Otis's concerns about “plac[ing] the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.” Michael, supra, at 908 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). at 805; see also id. Wurie was then charged with drug and firearm offenses. Shortly thereafter, police arrested Wurie for distributing crack cocaine and brought him to the police station. I find helpful the analysis in United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.2013) (en banc). Instead, they unanimously have concluded that the cell phone searches before them did not violate the Fourth Amendment. One of the officers typed that phone number into an online white pages directory, which revealed that the address associated with the number was on Silver Street in South Boston, not far from where Wurie had parked his car just before he was arrested. This case requires us to decide whether the police, after seizing a cell phone from an individual's person as part of his lawful arrest, can search the phone's data without a warrant. We therefore find it necessary to ask whether the warrantless search of data within a cell phone can ever be justified under Chimel. But this parade of horribles has not come to pass because we have established the constitutional line, and conscientious law enforcement officers have largely adhered to it. warrantless search and seizure of digital contents of a cell phone during an arrest is unconstitutional 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001). 2d 104 — Brought to you by Free Law Project, a non-profit dedicated to creating high quality open legal information. We find ourselves unconvinced. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky observes that this case may give the Court the opportunity to update its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). The district court denied Wurie's motion to suppress, United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. This appeal followed. The search could encompass things like text messages, e.g., Finley, 477 F.3d at 254, emails, e.g., People v. Nottoli, 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 884, 894 (Cal .Ct.App.2011), or photographs, e.g., Quintana, 594 F.Supp.2d at 1295–96, though the officers here only searched Wurie's call log. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974), in which the Court upheld the search and seizure of an arrestee's clothing ten hours after he was arrested. at 339 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). Each arrest has its own nuances and variations, from the item searched (as in this case) to the officer's control over it (as was the case in Chadwick ), and there could be infinite distinct categories of searches based on these variations. However, the invasive nature of the forensics examination, which included restoring previously deleted files, as well as “the uniquely sensitive nature of data on electronic devices,” id. Nov 15 2013: Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by respondent Brima Wurie. In the other case (United States v Wurie, 13-212), Brima Wurie was arrested in Massachusetts for dealing drugs. The Court again addressed the search-incident-to-arrest exception in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. Upon stopping Fred Wade, the man identified with the alleged drug sale, police discovered two bags of crack cocaine in his pocket. Id. Wurie's cell phone was on his person at the time of the arrest. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. In United States v. Wurie, the defendant, Brima Wurie, was arrested after a police officer observed him making “an apparent drug sale from a car.”15 The officers later seized two cell phones from Wurie at the police station.16 The phone at issue was a “flip phone” and … Specifically, the government points to the possibility that the calls on Wurie's call log could have been overwritten or the contents of his phone remotely wiped if the officers had waited to obtain a warrant.11 The problem with the government's argument is that it does not seem to be particularly difficult to prevent overwriting of calls or remote wiping of information on a cell phone today. at 960. See, e.g., Thornton, 541 U.S. at 623. In Gant, the Court emphasized the need for “the scope of a search incident to arrest” to be “commensurate with its purposes,” which include “protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.” 556 U.S. at 339; see also Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63 (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use ․ [and] to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.”). He was sentenced to 262 months in prison. But in this particular case, the professors dispute that a cellular phone could pose a safety threat—as a weapon can—to justify a warrantless intrusion. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, if we are concerned that police officers will exceed the limits of constitutional behavior while searching cell phones, then we should define those limits so that police can perform their job both effectively and constitutionally. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, No. Question Presented. Thus, the United States claims that, because in Robinson where a police officer found a crumpled cigarette packet containing heroin during a lawful arrest and the Court held that the warrantless search was lawful, here the search of Wurie’s cellphone was lawful. In that case, police officers, after observing multiple phone calls from the same number to an arrested drug dealer's cell phone, first answered the ringing cell phone and thereafter communicated to the caller via text message while posing as the arrestee, which led to the discovery of additional evidence. But the evidence in a cell phone is just as destructible as the evidence in a wallet: with the press of a few buttons, accomplished even remotely, cell phones can wipe themselves clean of data. Suspecting that Wurie was a drug dealer, that he was lying about his address, and that he might have drugs hidden at his house, Murphy took Wurie's keys and, with other officers, went to the Silver Street address associated with the “my house” number. at 809. Secondly, the United States maintains that the safety of police officers and the preservation of destructible evidence justify searching the areas within immediate control of arrestees. There must be an outer limit to their legality. If we are to fashion a rule, it cannot elide the facts before us. From this, the United States concludes that officers should always be allowed to search cell phone call logs because an individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in dialed phone numbers and that item-by-item judgment would be difficult to administer in the field. See United States v. Flores–Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir.2012) (holding that the police could retrieve an arrestee's cell phone number from his phone without a warrant, in part, because “the phone company knows a phone's number as soon as the call is connected to the telephone network; and obtaining that information from the phone company isn't a search because by subscribing to the telephone service the user of the phone is deemed to surrender any privacy interest he may have had in his phone number”) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43, 99 S.Ct. Among the items confiscated from Wurie was his cell phone, which rang repeatedly while he was detained. .And once law enforcement officers have We therefore hold that the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not authorize the warrantless search of data on a cell phone seized from an arrestee's person, because the government has not convinced us that such a search is ever necessary to protect arresting officers or preserve destructible evidence. Thus, while the search of Wurie's call log was less invasive than a search of text messages, emails, or photographs, it is necessary for all warrantless cell phone data searches to be governed by the same rule. The claim is made that Sheehan is inapposite to the present case because it concerned a challenge to the seizure, not the search. Instead of truly attempting to fit this case within the Chimel framework, the government insists that we should disregard the Chimel rationales entirely, for two reasons. I reach the same conclusion here. The Court upheld the search, concluding that once it became apparent that the items of clothing might contain destructible evidence of a crime, “the police were entitled to take, examine, and preserve them for use as evidence, just as they are normally permitted to seize evidence of crime when it is lawfully encountered.” Id. Instead, warrantless cell phone data searches strike us as a convenient way for the police to obtain information related to a defendant's crime of arrest—or other, as yet undiscovered crimes—without having to secure a warrant. at 803 (“[B]oth the person and the property in his immediate possession may be searched at the station house after the arrest has occurred․”). Further, Wurie contends, when an officer must take a motor vehicle regulation violator into custody, “a limited frisk of the suspect’s outer clothing in order to remove any weapons the suspect may have in his possession” is permissible. E.g., Davis v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, –––– – ––––, 131 S.Ct. Drugs do not disappear into thin air; weapons do not flee of their own accord. at 808 n. 9.6. Inside the apartment, they found a sleeping child who looked like the child in the picture on Wurie's phone. Under this rule, information in a cell phone or other electronic device may not be searched without a warrant incident to a defendant’s lawful arrest.Finally, Wurie claims that the United States is mistaken in claiming that there is a “settled framework” for searching personal information within other items and that holding that the search of Wurie’s cellphone was impermissible would not disrupt any long settled precedent. Of law enforcement efforts when facing technologically advanced criminals which also applied the Chimel rationales v. California and States. Represent the federal government FindLaw 's newsletter for legal professionals an unconstitutional seizure stopped by police Get U.S.! 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